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ABSTRACT: In this paper, I elaborate on the value of the notion of affect and the 
related concept of affective labour for a feminist-materialist critique. The core ar-
gument is that an affective conception of the relationship between subject and 
structure would allow for a constructive intervention into the definition of ‘materi-
alism’ that builds the ground for any critical social theory, but remains unfinished 
in the Marxist tradition. For that purpose, it will however be necessary to develop 
the concept of affect beyond the common, decidedly a-political interpretations 
that are part of the New Materialist Feminism, as well as beyond the overly em-
phatic connotations that the post-Workerist tradition has attached to it with re-
gards to its immeasurable characteristic that might allow for the creation a non-
capitalist future from within our present. 
KEYWORDS: Affective labour, materialist feminism, subjectivity, measure, Post-
Marxism
‘We want money, but capitalism knows, what’s better for us: Love! 
Therefore I think: Love must be colder than capital.’1 
René Pollesch, 2009
The relationship between gender and capital is complex – and yet, it lies at the 
heart of any attempt to contribute to a materialist, emancipatory social theory 
today, which is committed to understanding the ways in which social relations are 
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exploitative, oppressive and cause pain and suffering to some more than others, 
whilst not losing sight of the question of what it might mean to overturn them. 
Looking back at the 1970s, second-wave materialist feminism attempted to think 
this link primarily through a critique of classical Marxist concepts, exposing their 
inability to account for the problem of patriarchy and the persisting sexual division 
of labour. The Wages for Housework campaign, for example, tried to counter this 
deficiency by putting on display the unpaid, invisible work of women in the home 
and as part of a family, which despite not paying for it, capitalism fundamentally 
relied on for the reproduction of its core resource: labour power.2 Without want-
ing to either reduce materialist feminism to this specific theoretical moment, nor 
question the influence and importance of it for feminist activism and critique, past 
and present, we are today in a situation where we have to revisit and update the 
theoretical tools and reference points for a powerful feminist-materialist critique. 
Such an endeavour is bound up with the most fundamental question this critique 
can possibly face, namely what we are to understand by ‘materialism’ today after 
its Marxist grounds have been systematically deconstructed or at least rendered 
equivocal since the 1970s.3 Into this definitional vacuum entered a ‘new material-
ist feminism’ (see for example Alaimo and Hekman 2008) born out of a critique of 
second- and third-wave feminism and their continuation of the binary between 
biological essentialism and social constructionism. This strand started from a 
specific interest in the materiality of the body and was influenced by Deleuzian 
theory, actor-network theory, as well as quantum physics. For its proponents, 
materialism takes on a much more literal meaning than it ever had for Marxism, 
where it worked first and foremost as that which avoids and counters the pitfalls 
of idealism (Balibar 1994, 91). New materialist feminism becomes attached to the 
aim of accounting for ‘matter’ as itself endowed with agency, which the previous, 
human-centred approaches to feminism ignored. It thereby does not so much re-
spond directly to any previous definition of materialism, but instead reworks the 
one-sidedly discursive turn in feminist theory. Focused on the materiality of the 
female body and its interrelatedness, it challenges biologically deterministic ideas 
and thereby opens up a perspective in which ‘the female body is no longer a stable 
ground defined by clear-cut reproductive capacities’ (Chanter 2000, 266). 
This paper aims to contribute to this contestation of how to think ‘materiality’ 
and contends that it is only by cutting across the dividing lines of the two material-
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isms that we might be able to meet the need to complexify our categories in which 
we think ‘social relationality’ in accordance with contemporary capitalist reality. 
While there are many possible angles on this problem, of which certainly no sin-
gle one will be exhaustive, the notion of ‘affect’ imposes itself as a valuable entry 
point that is, however, in need of conceptual clarification. Its different theoretical 
mobilisations, as an ontological concept and as an adjective for labour (affective 
labour) allow us to analyse the politico-analytical claims that are tied to a certain 
definition of affective materiality and its relevance for re-materialising feminist 
critique. 
The Concept of Affect in the Spinozist-Deleuzian 
Tradition
The notion of affect, especially as employed in Deleuzian feminist theory (see 
Colebrook and Buchanan 2000) provides first and foremost a theoretical tool for 
thinking subject formation differently (see Hemmings 2005, 550) – without making 
the subject with a specific identity the starting or end point of any argument or line 
of thought. Instead it traces the formation of subjectivity in its movement beyond 
or beside itself through constant processes of subjectification and resistance (see 
Sedgwick and Frank 2003, 8).
There is no denying, or deferring, affects. They are what make up life, and art … 
Affects are … the stuff that goes on beneath, beyond, even parallel to significa-
tion. But what can one say about affects? Indeed, what needs to be said about 
them? … You cannot read affects, you can only experience them. (O’Sullivan 
2001, 126; cited in Hemmings 2005, 548–549)
Affect is therefore something that a subject experiences, in which she is beyond 
knowledge and signification. For Brian Massumi, one of the leading thinkers of af-
fect in a Spinozist-Deleuzian legacy, affect is the experiencing of changing intensity.
AFFECT/AFFECTION. Neither word denotes a personal feeling (sentiment in 
Deleuze and Guattari). L’affect (Spinoza’s affectus) is an ability to affect and be 
affected. It is a prepersonal intensity corresponding to the passage from one ex-
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periential state of the body to another and implying an augmentation or dimi-
nution in that body’s capacity to act. L’affection (Spinoza’s affectio) is each such 
state considered as an encounter between the affected body and a second, af-
fecting, body (with body taken in its broadest possible sense to include ‘mental’ 
or ideal bodies). (Massumi 2004, xiv)
In contrast to Arlie Hochschild’s notion of a woman’s ‘managed heart’, in which 
emotions and feelings are enacted or suppressed, a concept I will turn to fur-
ther below, affect for Massumi works essentially against the line between head 
and heart, as completely non-linear, un-assimilable and un-directible, fol-
lowing no logic or order that is discernible from the subject’s standpoint (see 
Massumi 2002, 25–27). Affect is therefore different from the personal and so-
cially embedded emotions and feelings, which are intensities that are ‘owned 
and recognized’ (Massumi 2002, 28). At the same time, affect is the very con-
dition for interaction as it opens up the body’s vitality, whereas emotions 
aim at closure and at capturing the free-floating affects. In the same sense, 
Eric Shouse claims: ‘you cannot invest in affect, only in the hope of being 
moved’ (Shouse 2005). 
In her auto-ethnographic analysis of the affective labour done by a waitress, 
Emma Dowling (2012), whilst acknowledging the important insights of Hoch-
schild’s analysis, supports the possibility and productivity of such a differentia-
tion between emotion and affect in relation to the ways the waitress produces the 
‘dining experience’. For Dowling, it is not the management of emotions, but rather 
‘affective reconnaissance – instantaneous production and response –‘ (Dowling 
2012, 111) that defines the work as a waitress.
I’m not simply on display. I create in you not just a state of mind, I create a feel-
ing in your body, invoking or suppressing my own feelings in order to do so. 
What I produce is affect and that is the value of my work. Crucially, I can’t do this 
on my own. I need you to be part of this process. I use my capacity to affect and 
your capacity to be affected, and vice versa too. You’re not just on the receiv-
ing end … we’re in this together: adrift in the negotiation of our desires only to 
be hauled back by the complex power relations unfolding as we play, we are 
locked in a relationship …. (Dowling 2012, 110)
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Thus, being attentive to the affective component within affective labour relation-
ships means, firstly, to grasp the way that ‘forces of subjectivity [are] laced through 
with structural causality’ creating a messy mix of ‘attachment, self-continuity and 
the reproduction of life’ within a specific material scene of the present (Berlant 
2011, 15; see also Steyerl 2010) that cannot be adequately captured by any form 
of dualism (structure – agency or subject – object), even a dialectical one. The 
scene in which affect is put to work is at the same time singular and relational 
(see Read 2013), there is no guarantee for a successful completion of the job 
and yet, the only way to succeed is through a momentary alignment of desires: 
‘we’re in this together’. In Dowling’s example of the waitress, the product of her 
labour can no longer be described by the four forms of alienation – namely al-
ienation from yourself, your co-workers, the product of your labour and society 
as a whole – that Karl Marx had identified in the 1844 Manuscripts under the con-
cept of the ‘objectification’ of labour leading to the loss of the object (see Marx 
1975, pp.322). Producing the dining experience demands investing labour time 
not only into an object that is external and thus, alien, to the worker’s needs and 
desires. Instead, desires are projected, maybe attached to an alien scene, in a non-
unilateral way in which moments of estrangement are intertwined with a more 
positive attachment or attunement. As the opposite of a rational genesis, the af-
fective genesis ‘cannot be projected from the labourer onto the “product”, – in this 
case the dining experience – but it only works if all parties are equally affected 
by their shared object of desire.’ (Balibar 1998, 110) ‘Affects … do not require a 
subject as their addressee’ (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2010, 13), and yet they constantly 
subject everyone who finds herself in an affective relationship or encounter to 
their energies.
The Cruelty of Affect
In her critique of the overemphatic usage of the concept of affect, Lisa Black-
man argues that ‘the complex processes of subject-constitution […] induce both 
becoming and becoming-stuck’ (Blackman 2008, 47) and therefore importantly 
points to the ‘other’ side of affect, which Massumi, amongst others, seems to stra-
tegically under-emphasise. In order to draw attention to this second dimension of 
any affective encounter, in which the ‘hope of being moved’ (Shouse 2005) might 
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just as well turn into an unavoidable vulnerability, we need to interrogate more 
closely the specific relationship of bodies within space. Here, I ground my inquiry 
on Teresa Brennan’s argument on the transmission of affect, in which she argues 
against a subject’s self-containment: a subject is always open to the other’s ener-
gies that are socially invoked and can have physical and biological effects, e.g. 
when entering a room. Affects are contagious (Brennan 2004, 68) and at the same 
time, they have the enormous power of ‘the unexpected that throws us off bal-
ance, that unsettles us into becoming someone other than who we currently are’ 
(Hemmings 2005, 549). Such an effect becomes extremely precarious in combi-
nation with an argument made by Clare Hemmings, which she develops on the 
basis of Sara Ahmed’s examination of how Frantz Fanon sees his body through 
the fearful eyes of the white boy. Fanon describes his body as trembling of fear, 
which the boy however misrecognizes as ‘shivering with rage’. Following Ahmed, 
the boy develops his fear of the black man based on misrecognition, because past 
histories stick to the present in the form of racial stereotypes. In her analysis of 
the effects of affect on subjectivities, Hemmings develops the claim that there 
is a similar ‘heteronormative regulation’ (Hemmings 2005, 560) of affect within 
space that works ‘along racially defined lines’ (Ahmed 2000) and, as I want to add 
here, also along lines defined by class and gender. This implies that affect is not 
as random, unpredictable and autonomous as Massumi likes to think, but that 
there is an ‘affective trajectory’ (Hemmings 2005, 564) to be taken into account 
that is actually able to shape not only the meaning of the social for the individual 
and her ability to act in the world, but also the perception that the individual has 
of her self. 
Going down a similar path, Lauren Berlant (2011) identifies within our affec-
tive attachments no potential to develop a transgressive force, but an extremely 
violent promise, norm or fantasy of the ‘good life’. This promise becomes violent 
precisely in circumstances where the conditions of possibility of its realisation are 
compromised, or plainly non-existent within our present; rather than helping us 
to go beyond the confines of the unequal and exploitative relationships we find 
ourselves in, our affective attachments are maintained in light of the illusion of a 
better future to come. Berlant calls this form of affective relationship ‘cruel opti-
mism’ (Berlant 2011, 24), emphasising not the Marxian idea of the past weighing 
‘like a nightmare on the brains of the living’ (Marx 1975b), but instead the ‘weight 
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of the present’ (Ashbery cited in Berlant 2011, 29) that needs to be equally taken 
into account in order to understand our contemporary condition.
It can provide a way to assess the disciplines of normativity in relation to the 
disorganized and disorganizing processes of labour, longing, memory, fantasy, 
grief, acting out, and sheer psychic creativity through which people constantly 
(consciously, unconsciously, dynamically) renegotiate the terms of reciprocity 
that contour their historical situation. (Berlant 2011, 53)
Thus, Berlant provides us with an entry point into understanding affective rela-
tionships as a very material aspect of our existence helping us to grasp our po-
litical impasses from the vantage point of a messy and yet ‘shared historical time’ 
(Berlant 2011, 15). However, we have not yet clarified how we might be able to 
conceptualise this present and its specific structures and processes that decide 
over whether and for whom a good life can be attained or not. The question is 
therefore not only how affect works ontologically, but, as the preceding discussion 
has brought to light, how  is it ‘put to work’ within our late capitalist society and its 
corresponding subjectivities? How is affect made productive and for whom?
Post-Fordism, Biopolitics & Affective Labour
The notion of affective labour is a rather recent conceptual invention that gained 
attention and importance especially through its prominent place in Michael Hardt 
and Antonio Negri’s delineation of ‘Empire’ and its sites of potential resistance for 
the working class or the multitude (Hardt and Negri 2004; 2000). The discussion 
around the concept that finds its main ground in the work of the Italian post-Work-
erist Marxist tradition around Negri and Hardt, as well as around Paolo Virno and 
Maurizio Lazzarato, is built on two combined lines of thought (Diefenbach 2011). 
The first line of thought starts from the Marxist debate around capital and its 
utilisation of the human labour force (see Marx 1976, 283). Following Katja Die-
fenbach, there are two tendencies in the early and late Marx that are maintained 
and merged in post-Workerism, which is the ontological idea of ‘labour as self-
generation’ or ‘creative vitality’ taken from the Paris Manuscripts, combined with 
the ‘historical-critical theses […] on the socialisation of production’ (Diefenbach 
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2011). But whereas the late Marx began his critique of the capitalist accumulation 
of wealth or the ‘creation of value for value’ (Fortunati 1995, 7) from the command 
of capital, especially in its generalised form, money, (see Negri 1991), Italian Work-
erism and post-Workerism take labour and its antagonistic position to capital as 
their starting point. 
The only use value, therefore, which can form the opposite pole to capital is 
labour (to be exact, value-creating, productive labour). (Marx, Grundrisse, cited 
in Negri 1991, 63; emphasis in original)
This reconceptualisation implies – against an orthodox value-theoretical interpre-
tation of an economic law that ahistorically prefigures the relationality of capital 
and labour from the point of view of capital – that capital’s power depends on and 
is thus limited by its relationship with labour as living labour from which it needs 
to extract surplus value in order to valorise itself (see Negri 1991, 58). 
The specificity of the post-Workerist perspective is furthermore determined by 
an understanding of late-capitalist society as a post-Fordist society, which differs 
from a Fordist society in the forms of valorisation of capital, and thus the nature of 
work and the position of the working class vis-à-vis capital. Theorists like Lazzara-
to, Negri and Hardt describe the transition from a Fordist to a post-Fordist society 
as a transition in the nature of productive labour towards ‘intellectual, immaterial, 
and communicative labour’ starting in the 1970s (Hardt and Negri 2000, 29). Im-
material labour is characterised by the intangibility of its products and, more spe-
cifically, through producing ‘first and foremost a social relation’ (Lazzarato 1996, 
142) – something that can only be co-created between worker and client and that 
potentially lasts far beyond the moment of its consumption. This mode of produc-
tion as ‘enriched to the level of complexity of human interaction’ (Hardt and Ne-
gri 2000, 293) and immanently dependent on cooperation is supposed to create 
social networks and communities. ‘[T]he “raw material[s]” of immaterial labor is 
subjectivity as well as the “ideological” environment in which this subjectivity lives 
and reproduces’ (Lazzarato 1996, 142), including language, communication and 
knowledge. Immaterial labour can then also be understood as capitalism’s striv-
ing ‘to find an unmediated way of establishing command over subjectivity itself’, 
which explains a link between immaterial labour and ‘precariousness, hyperex-
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ploitation, mobility, and hierarchy’ (Lazzarato 1996, 134–135). This development is 
also often referred to as the ‘feminisation of work’ as working conditions that have 
traditionally been associated with women’s work are generalised throughout the 
post-Fordist economy (see Endnotes 2013).
For Hardt, Negri, and others, this implies that the classical Marxist theory of 
value, which argues that capital relies on the objective measurability of the value 
of labour through the invested, socially-necessary labour time, needs to be re-
vised. In these newly emerging ‘spaces of self-valorization’ (Negri 2008, 21), capital 
becomes ‘incapable of understanding the creative energy of labour’ (Negri 2008, 
20) and therefore can no longer account for and extract all the surplus value that 
is produced in the economy. What they therefore find in the post-Fordist forms of 
immaterial labour is an immanent communist element.
Because there is no value without exploitation. Communism is thus the de-
struction at the same time of the law of value, of value itself, of its capitalist or 
socialist variants. Communism is the destruction of exploitation and the eman-
cipation of living labour. Of non-labour. That and it is enough. Simply. (Negri 
1999, 83)
This new theory of value needs to be understood as closely linked to the Fou-
cauldian argument that a new form of power entered the realm of the social in the 
nineteenth century called biopower. Foucault describes biopower as the moment 
when life itself in its abstractness, as ‘bios’, becomes the object of state control, 
and contrasts it to the still persisting earlier forms of control such as disciplinary 
control, in which life remained ‘outside the contract’ between the sovereign and 
the people (Foucault et al. 2003, 241). In parallel, Negri sees the new forms of la-
bour as biopoliticised. This means that there is no more inside or outside of labour 
power from capitalist command, no more possibility of distinguishing between 
use and exchange value, or work and leisure: every act of economic production 
is at the same time a production of the social, which means in reversal that eve-
rything becomes productive (see Negri 1999, 80); using Marx’s terminology, Negri 
calls this movement ‘real subsumption’4. 
In this entanglement of life made for production and production producing 
life, the new labouring practices supposedly also lead to the emergence of com-
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pletely new forms of becoming-human, of subjectivities. And at the same time that 
‘exploitation can no longer be localised and quantified’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 
209), those new, and foremost collective, subjectivities build a power of resistance 
against capital, a new ‘potentia’ ‘from below’ (Negri 1999, 78): affect.
In this paradoxical way, labour becomes affect, or better, labour finds its value in 
affect, if affect is defined as the ‘power to act’ (Spinoza). The paradox can thus be 
reformulated in these terms: The more the theory of value loses its reference to 
the subject (measure was this reference as a basis of mediation and command), 
the more the value of labour resides in affect, that is, in living labour that is 
made autonomous in the capital relation, and expresses – through all the pores 
of singular and collective bodies – its power of self-valorization. (Negri 1999, 
79–80; Emphasis in original)
Here, we find ourselves entering into the second line of thought, by which the Ital-
ian post-Workerists, indebted to Spinoza and Deleuze, inquire into the specific 
meaning and force of affect within the new forms of post-Fordist labour. In gen-
eral, affective labour in Hardt and Negri is defined as a sub-category of immate-
rial labour, in which they see ‘a unique alignment between the ontological pos-
sibilities of our being [following Spinoza’s ontological category] and the activities 
comprising our economic life …’ (Federici 2011, 64; my insertion). The specificity 
of affective labour is the ‘creation and manipulation of affect’ in order to create 
‘a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement or passion’ (Hardt and Ne-
gri 2000, 293), which is mostly achieved through virtual or actual human contact, 
mainly associated with kin work, care work, health services, the entertainment in-
dustry, and other kinds of services.5 Beyond this characterization, affective labour 
remains, I would say, problematically underdeveloped within their writings. 
What is new about affective labour that justifies its prominent discussion is 
not its mere existence in the labour market, as there have always been jobs that 
involved the production and manipulation of affects and emotions, but its newly 
acquired dominance as, according to Hardt, it produces the highest value for the 
current economic system (Hardt 1999, 97). 
Following a Spinozist-Deleuzian legacy, for Hardt and Negri this production of 
affect that becomes the value of labour appears as a potentiality, a ‘power to act’ 
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(Negri 1999, 79) or ‘potentia’ beyond measure (see Anderson 2010), which limits 
capital to no more than a parasite that is trying, but not actually fully achieving 
to appropriate the creative forces of affective labour. This potentiality arises from 
affect’s essential immeasurability, as always excessive and an ‘expansive power’ 
(Negri 1999, 77) that, in its limitlessness and autonomy is able to expose the very 
limits of the power of capital.  
Against the backdrop of these, as well as Dowling’s and others reflections on 
the nature of affective labour, we can conclude that a fundamental contribution 
of this debate that was very much initiated by Hardt and Negri is the re-affirmation 
that labour and life are much more intimately entangled than previous concep-
tions might have suggested. But rather than embracing too quickly the primacy 
of the production of social relations as a potential escape route from exploitation, 
we should try and subject Hardt and Negri’s suggestions to the rigorous interro-
gation that they deserve. This means that we need to utilise the lens of affective 
labour in order to excavate the complex and constantly differing entanglements 
between the workings of capital and power within and on the labour process, 
on the worker’s subjectivity and her social relations, which in a post-Fordist 
economy function on the basis of aligning strivings and desires that in past la-
bour regimes might have been experienced as much more clear-cut, structural 
antagonisms. 
The Immeasurability Hypothesis
As Hardt and Negri have suggested, power that has become biopower needs to 
be understood in its direct relation to capital’s struggle towards finding new, ad-
equate forms of valorisation, which has one of its sites of struggle (and only one) 
in the field of affective labour. It is in this context that we need to re-assess their 
hypothesis that, whilst affective labour produces value for capital, it also always 
produces a form of excess, a form of life that remains outside of capital’s reach 
and instead offers possibilities of the workers’ self-valorisation, or ‘commoning’. As 
Massimo de Angelis and David Harvie have shown, since the late 1970s, cognitive 
capitalism has, far from capitulating before the various forms of immaterial and 
affective value, started to race towards new and intensified forms of standardi-
sation, quantification and surveillance of labour through what the authors call a 
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‘war over measure’ (De Angelis and Harvie 2009, 4), which results in an increasing 
commodification of the life sphere, including the sphere of social reproduction.
Through an interpretation of the Marxian category of ‘socially-necessary la-
bour time’6 as not only a past quantum of expended time in a factory, but as both 
‘the result of past measuring processes and the present benchmark’ that workers 
are confronted with by management and other organisational surveillance mech-
anisms (De Angelis and Harvie 2009, 7), they show how the valorisation of affective 
and other immaterial values that are part of the labour process, but not necessar-
ily directly visible or accountable for in the end product (see Dowling 2007, 128), 
can still be measured, commanded and transformed into value for capital.
In her study of the waitress as an affective labourer, Dowling shows in great 
detail how the affective part of her work is precisely prescribed, commanded, 
trained and evaluated by behavioural manuals, training sessions, different forms 
of assessment and importantly the wage relation itself that creates stimuli and 
performance-increasing hierarchies between the staff of the restaurant – even 
though the affective labour the waitress engages in remains ‘non attributive’ 
within the overall product (Dowling 2007, 121). Thus, Dowling helps us to grasp 
the force of capital, specifically in the context of a growing precarisation and im-
miseration of the work force more generally, that lies behind the various forms of 
mediation between affective relationships, subjectivities and power as immanent 
to the work process. The forms of mediation she describes succeed in overcoming 
the problems of immeasurability and instead focus on the perpetuation or intensi-
fied separation, isolation and inequalities between workers along gendered and 
racialised lines for the sake of economic value creation.7 
Going back to Read’s work on a Spinozist critique of political economy, we can 
understand these new levels of indirect measure in a context of an increased sense 
of insecurity and precarity among workers as part of the fundamental structure of 
a post-Fordist or neoliberal affective composition of labour relations, which Read 
describes as ‘a regime of fear (tinged with hope)’ (Read 2013). Whilst an inquiry 
into specific affective labour processes, such as waitressing, then allows us to dis-
cern the ways in which this regime of fear and its war over measure is executed, 
it necessarily deconstructs the possibility of any simplistic assumptions about a 
primacy of self-valorisation as opposed to capitalist valorisation within affective 
labour environments in the sense Hardt and Negri suggest. 
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Affective Labour as ‘Women’s Work’ – 
Between Structure and Subject
Another important angle for the argument of this paper is to take into view the 
neglected element in Hardt and Negri’s analysis, namely the fact that the female 
members of the work force are significantly over-represented in the sphere of af-
fective labour compared to other non-affective occupations (Hochschild 2003, 
171; see also Weeks 2004). Hardt and Negri and other theorists from the Italian 
autonomist or post-Workerist Marxist tradition only refer very marginally to the 
specific role of the female worker in affective labour occupations (Hardt and Negri 
2000, 293; McRobbie 2010, 62). The most we know is that, whereas one facet of 
immaterial labour is importantly tied to informational services related to commu-
nication technologies, computing and analytical services more broadly, its other 
facet is affective labour, which, following Hardt, is best understood by feminist 
inquiries into ‘women’s work’ (Hardt 1999, 95–96). It is therefore important to in-
vestigate what kind of jobs it implies, who the workers are and how its affective 
component plays out in the labour relation – something Hardt and Negri only pe-
ripherally engage in. 
In parallel, there is a feminist critique of labour that is leery of the very no-
tion of ‘affective labour’ and designates it as unhelpful or even damaging to the 
political struggles that they have been fighting around the question of work and 
capital’s gendered structures of exploitation. For Silvia Federici (2011), Hardt and 
Negri’s endeavour appears deeply problematic in the way in which they gener-
alise affective labour as a condition of late-capitalist forms of work. Instead of 
emphasising the gendered dimension of affective labour, they engage in an ‘un-
gendering’ discourse by emphasising ‘the feminization of all work’ (Federici 2011, 
70), leaving once again the bulks of waged and unwaged reproductive work done 
by a majority of women all over the globe unproblematised, as if the feminist re-
conceptualisation of labour had not taken place. To underline, moreover, the im-
plausibility of such a homogenisation in the forms and conditions of work on a 
global scale that Hardt and Negri envision based on Marx’s concept of ‘real sub-
sumption’, Federici emphasises the historical discontinuities that have been es-
sential for the successful reproduction of capitalism, i.e. the fact that housework 
has never been industrialised (Federici 2011, 63; see also Federici 2012, 106). 
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Besides, the focus on affective labour blurs the lines of demarcation that femi-
nists had established in order to achieve recognition of women’s work specifi-
cally where it is unpaid or concentrated in reproductive rather than productive 
labour.8 It follows that to introduce affective labour as a potentiality because it 
contains an element of non-labour within it does not sit easily with those lines of 
feminist critique, as it once again limits the focus on the paid work that women 
do – thereby moving backwards in the history of feminist struggle (see Federici 
2011, Federici 2012, 97). Further, Hardt and Negri’s emphasis on capital loosing 
measure as its basis of mediation and command within affective labour contexts 
sounds less ground-breaking from those feminist viewpoints, aware that there 
have always existed different forms of domination for the waged and unwaged 
sphere, which has been precisely identified as part of capital’s method of pro-
ducing and reproducing the gender distinction (see Endnotes 2013). Thus, it re-
mains to be seen if it will be possible to find a merit to the concept of affective 
labour that is indeed able to contribute something to existing feminist discourses 
around work.
What we need to bring together in this section is an understanding of the 
structural inequalities that women face in the labour market up to now, includ-
ing their naturalised exclusion from it, which is tied to their responsibility to do 
unwaged work in the sphere of the home, and the effects that working in occu-
pations that over-proportionally demand affective labour or ‘labour in the bod-
ily mode’ (Hardt and Negri 2000, 293) has. Such occupations include caring la-
bour, kin work, nurturing and maternal activities – or, in other words, the work 
of the nannies, sex workers, maids and flight attendants of this world. All these 
occupations have a primary affective component and are widely argued to be 
closely related to the ‘natural’ responsibility of women, which, in turn obscures 
the fact that the labelling of this type of labour as ‘the labour of love’ is precise-
ly an instrument to hide the gendering that is part of this structural form of op-
pression, making those activities into ‘non-labour’. I will therefore, in a first step, 
look at Arlie Hochschild’s ‘The Managed Heart’ (2003) and emotional and affec-
tive processes at work in the realm of an area of classical waged labour, namely 
the work of flight attendants. Then I will explore, following Hochschild & Barbara 
Ehrenreich (2002), Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez (2007) as well as Susanne 
Schultz (2006), the role of affective labour in the field of reproduction and house-
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work on a global scale, whose waged dimension is a recent and ambiguous 
component (see Federici 2012, 102). 
In this part of the analysis, I will allow for an intermingling of the usage of the 
terms feeling, emotion and affect even though it partly contradicts a clear dis-
tinction that can be made between emotion and affect, as I have shown earlier. 
However, I suggest that especially Hochschild’s analysis that focuses on emotions 
rather than affect undoubtedly offers an important ground for understanding the 
workings on subjectivity that we find within fields of affective labour and shows 
how close the relation between an emotional and an affective dimension within 
these forms of work is without becoming interchangeable (see Dowling 2012, 115). 
Blurring those dividing lines is furthermore justified by the aim of this section to 
unpack what Angela Mitropoulos calls ‘the indistinction between intimacy and 
economy’ (Mitropoulos 2012, 106) means for the female labour force in terms of 
the interrelation of new forms of exploitation and the formation of subjectivities. 
That also means that my interest in understanding the effects of capital’s valorisa-
tion processes needs a certain openness towards the subjective and a-subjective 
forms of intimacy that are put to work.
Hochschild’s argument as to why affective labour is a form of work to which 
women are more strongly subjected than men, and which is therefore gendered, 
vehemently rejects any form of a naturalising discourse and is instead based on 
the fundamental fact that women have been made into ‘a subordinate social stra-
tum’ of society (Hochschild 2003, 163). This reduction implies that women are 
driven into affective labour jobs through a lack of other resources than their feel-
ings and specifically their ability to ‘be nice’ and ‘manage their heart’, which they 
have learned through a specific childhood training as well as through a weaker 
status shield caused by their general subordination. For Hochschild, emotion is 
‘a bodily orientation to an imaginary act’ (Hochschild 2003, 28), a signal function 
that enables individuals to know about the world, similar to seeing and hearing. 
Based on her empirical research, Hochschild comes to understand feelings not as 
biological organismic reactions, but as the outcome of ‘attending to inner sensa-
tion in a given way’ (Hochschild 2003, 27), making the management of our feelings 
a substantial part of what is felt in the first place rather than a slight ‘tainting’. Her 
investigation focuses on the question of what happens to a subject when she does 
not only use, and more specifically, manage her emotions in the private sphere, 
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but when these emotions become a resource for sale. Thus, her characterisation 
of what Hardt and Negri call ‘labour in the bodily mode’ focuses primarily on the 
right of the employer ‘to exercise a degree of control over the emotional activities 
of employees’ (Hochschild 2003, 147). 
Hochschild elaborates on this point by means of the example of flight at-
tendants and bill collectors, which she sees as two opposite poles within the 
general forms of emotional labour, ‘the toe and the heel of capitalism’ (Hoch-
schild 2003, 16): the flight attendants whose smiles and care are supposed to 
enhance the customers’ experience, and the bill collectors whose aim is to en-
tice fear and anger in the customers so that they feel pressured to balance out 
their open accounts. Emotional labour for Hochschild means that a subject in-
creasingly starts to sell feelings or emotions that she does not genuinely have, 
or that, even to the contrary, she has to enact through the suppression of com-
pletely different feelings. In order to manage their feelings, the workers use the 
instruments of ‘surface acting’ and ‘deep acting’ (Hochschild 2003, 33). Whereas 
surface acting refers merely to an act of pretending and appearing in a certain 
way to the outside world, deep acting demands from the worker not only to de-
ceive the ‘other’, the client, but also to deceive herself about her emotions, and 
thus about ‘her real self’. By means of creating inner feelings through objectify-
ing them in the ‘learning process’, this process of deep acting literally creates a 
new self by supposing an ‘as if’ against the reality. According to Hochschild, eve-
ryone applies this technique to a certain extent within private lives and private 
social roles, but it becomes extremely precarious with regard to self-estrangement 
and identity confusion when it enters the economic sphere of the labour market, 
where it is sold under the command of the employer and therefore ultimately of 
capital (Hochschild 2003, 132). 
Transposing our investigation onto the global level, we can further identify 
what Hochschild and Ehrenreich refer to as ‘a global heart transplant’. In this devel-
opment, ‘love and care become the new gold’ (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002, 
22; 26), namely a resource that cannot only, as in the case of the flight attend-
ants, be artificially created, but also ‘displace[d] or redirect[ed]’ (Ehrenreich and 
Hochschild 2002, 23). In the cases that Hochschild and Ehrenreich illustrate under 
the headline ‘Global Woman’, the globalised good is the ‘women’s traditional role’ 
(Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002, 13). Essentially, it is love that is redirected from 
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the global South to the global North, as for example, from a mother’s own child 
towards a child that she cares for as a nannie in a Western household in which 
the need for reproductive work has problematically persisted despite the revolu-
tion in women’s possibilities for waged employment. This redirection seems to be 
induced by what Federici describes as ‘near-zero-reproduction’ zones that capi-
tal has created in the global South, i.e. the separation of large populations from 
their means of subsistence whilst neither supplying wage-labour opportunities 
nor (state) support for social reproduction. Under the law of exchange value, the 
time a nannie spends with another woman’s child is worth more than the time 
she spends with her own child, having no (exchange) value and preventing her 
from investing her demanded ‘loving’ abilities towards productive activity (see 
also Rose 1983, 83). It is in this context that Schultz develops her critique of Hardt 
and Negri’s obvious neglect of the persisting gender, race and class inequalities in 
the contemporary reconfiguration of production and reproduction, in which she 
sees a continuation of the structure of unwaged work in the work of reproduction 
on an international level, which is not questioned by the blurred boundaries that 
differentiate productive from reproductive work in the first place (Schultz 2006). 
Following Hochschild, Federici goes as far as to argue that what we observe in 
this dynamic is a global and permanent reproduction crisis that lies at the heart of 
capitalism’s functioning (Federici 2012, 104).9  
Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez’s research (2007) gives us a more phenom-
enologically oriented perspective on the specific vulnerability of female migrant 
workers in affective labour occupations. In her study of migrants doing care and 
domestic work in European households,10 Rodríguez identifies the moment of spa-
tial closeness in which feelings of isolation and alienation of the worker, who very 
often does not speak the same language as the employer and does not belong 
to the same class, are confronted with an extreme relational intimacy within the 
space of the household as the centre of family life. Rodríguez notes a dissolution 
of boundaries between bodies and their affective binding-together through the 
work relationship, which then becomes more than that, namely a ‘contribution 
to the production of life’ (Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2007, 16). She makes explicit that 
the spaces of affective labour as sites where not only economic, but also social 
relationships are produced and reproduced, create an extreme tension between 
affect, power and subjectivities.
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Most notable here is not the fact that such a blurring of boundaries might be 
unlikely to happen outside of these spaces of affective labour, but that this blur-
ring inside the household is taking place between the two subjects of employer 
and employee induced by the nature of the work, rather than willingly or con-
sciously initiated by one of the individuals (see Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2007, 19). This 
means that, although what counts in order for the work task to be accomplished 
are affects, emotions and feelings in the abstract and not the individual that has 
these affects, emotions and feelings, there is always an encounter between bod-
ies involved in which employer and employee (or flight attendant and passen-
ger in Hochschild’s example) ‘articulate and negotiate their desires, needs and 
moments of identification and dis-identification’ on an affective level (Gutiérrez 
Rodríguez 2007, 21). 
For Rodríguez, the household as one specific space of affective labour can be 
best described with Foucault’s notion of ‘heterotopia’: a space ‘by which we are 
drawn outside of ourselves’ (Foucault 2000, 177). It points towards the ambiguity 
of the space that affective labour creates in which the potentiality of unexpected 
encounters that enable the renegotiation of power and subject relations go hand 
in hand with the fact that the latter usually starts from extremely unequal rela-
tions, putting one subject more at risk than another.
Conclusion
My contention is here that Rodríguez does not go far enough with her critique and 
specifically that she falls behind the potential of the concept of affective labour 
for a feminist-materialist critique that I have tried to delineate by showing how 
it simultaneously operates on two, intertwined levels. Rodríguez emphasises the 
phenomenological aspect focusing on the problem of estrangement and aliena-
tion through emotional and affective impacts on or ‘besides’ the labourer’s sub-
jectivity. Her and Hochschild, taken in conjuncture with the earlier elaborations 
of affect’s impact on subjectivities, have helped us to understand that to affect 
and to be affected or, in Hochschild’s case, to endow emotions with exchange 
value necessarily involves that the worker, who is more likely female than male, 
puts herself at risk. The potential of transformation through affective attach-
ments and relations always involves the possibility of getting hurt and of having 
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to cope with what Brennan calls ‘negative affects’ (Brennan 2004, 22). Another 
implication is the gendering potential of any affective encounter that hides be-
hind what Hemmings identified as the heteronormativity of affect, which would 
then work precisely against any going beyond or besides of a subject and against 
Hardt and Negri’s vision of the emergence of new subjectivities. Instead, we 
would have to come to terms with the increasing reinforcement of existing lines 
of inequality on an affective level within the context of work. In Katie Weeks’ more 
general terms:
Gender is also produced and productive when personality is put to work. As 
Hochschild points out, personalities are gendered and that is part of their value 
to employers. (Weeks 2007, 9)
It is not only ‘the affective intensity associated with exploitation’ (Gibson-Graham, 
Resnick, and Wolff 2000, 14–15), but also the subjectivities of the workers in their 
becoming and their performativity within and against power that are constantly 
negotiated and contested within affective labour processes. If the very notion of 
affective labour does not encourage us to closely investigate these risks inherent 
in specific work spaces and interpersonal relationships – whose power effects the 
‘affective turn’ importantly emphasised –, then it bears the danger of losing its 
theoretical and political meaning.
However, there is a second level of critique, which this paper has tried to ex-
cavate and which is key to making the notion of affective labour into a concept 
that is of use to a feminist-materialist approach. Taking Hardt and Negri’s develop-
ments as a starting, rather than an end point, affective labour allows for a struc-
tural analysis of the changing relation between capital and labour. We have seen 
how the production of life, of sociality and intimacy, is not merely a question of 
uncomfortably blurred boundaries or the worsening of a work-life balance against 
which we can demand more life and less working hours (Mitropoulos 2012, 174). 
This inquiry has foregrounded the heavily gendered character of affective labour, 
which includes paid and unpaid labour. Moreover, it has shown that the imposi-
tion of the need to work and to earn a wage allows capital to continue to create 
hierarchies, divisions and attachments within the work force that reproduces and 
reinforces the gender division of labour (see also Schneider 2013, 398). 
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Talking about ‘affective’ labour in this structural context now neatly allows for 
the integration of the first and second level, which challenges a purely structural 
account of ‘the logic of gender’ as for example Endnotes (2013) developed. Where 
they argue in their conclusion that ‘the present moment allows us to see both 
our class-belonging and our gender-belonging as external constraints’ (Endnotes 
2013) that can be abolished, an approach via affective labour would not be as 
quick to affirm such an ‘externality’ of the gender-constraint. It will undoubtedly 
agree that there is nothing ‘natural’ to the gender category, and yet that does not 
mean that the subjects that have been formed in relation to it understand or expe-
rience it as a merely external constraint. In as far as there is no un-alienated form 
of life of which we could become conscious, there is also no straight-forward way 
of liberating our ways of existence and our ‘selves’ from the forces of subjectiva-
tion that infinitely expand within it, by treating it in a compartmentalised man-
ner. Instead, the category of affect enables us to understand our shared material, 
ontological and epistemological investment in the capitalist present and might 
therefore be able to help us devise adequate political strategies for its contesta-
tion in search for a different life.
Postscript: Affective Labour as Site of Struggle 
But I want to shoot cold from the hip. And not supply with my life as value these 
endless reproductions of life. My identity as woman is really only a permanent 
production of disciplinary actions. […] My revolt does not always need to be-
come a self-sacrifice! Of course as a woman, that disgraces herself, I am the 
event. And your bad treatment is also the event. (Pollesch 2009, 179; 186)
If we can neither shoot cold from the hip as a character in René Pollesch’s thea-
tre play Love is colder than capital laments, nor rely on an ontological, subversive 
potential of the workings of affect in our labour relations, then how can a femi-
nist-materialist politics be thought that takes the affective component within the 
capital – labour antagonism, which I argue remains intact even in the context of 
cognitive capitalism, into account? Angela Mitropolous suggests that maybe ‘the 
oikos is haunted not by communism’ (as Hardt and Negri make us believe), ‘but 
by disaffection, a detachment from the oikonomic that signals attachments other-
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wise and, for this reason, barely deciphered by conventional political analyses, but 
nevertheless distinctly uncanny’ (Mitropoulos 2012, 175). Can we cause our affec-
tive comportments and conscious emotions to become even colder than capital 
has already rendered them? Pollesch’s title of his play, Love is colder than capital is 
an adaptation of Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s film from 1969 entitled Love is colder 
than death. In both cases the description of love as ‘colder’ than capital / death 
can be understood as programmatic: Fassbinder and Pollesch portray love rela-
tions that are damaged by their social conditions (economic and political), filled 
with clichés that cause misery for the lovers and the suffocation of the relation-
ships. And we learn from both works of art that these damaged love relations do 
in turn not exist besides capital or the police state or the political party, but on the 
inside of them and thus, need to be treated as such. However, Pollesch attaches a 
double meaning to the adjective ‘cold’, when he introduces the idea of ‘shooting 
cold from the hip’. Here, cold stands in opposition to the warm love melodrama 
that the capitalist bourgeois society imposes on its subjects. Cold as the refusal 
not so much of not participating at all but of withdrawing the loving, emotional 
and affective capacities (as citizen-subject, loving wife or husband or affective la-
bourer). ‘But I want it cold’ (Pollesch 2009, 187) could then be read as: if I have to 
participate at all, at least as a cold, passive object in which nothing is left to be 
loved or to love. 
However, as Federici has shown in relation to reproductive work, the refusal of 
affective labour is not only complicated by an increasing dependency on the wage 
in times of a global crisis, austerity regimes and generalised privatisation of public 
services. In addition, affective labour, similar if not as exclusively as reproductive 
labour, has a double character as it not only reproduces labour power, but also 
life itself, the living individual that exists for the labour market as much as for the 
revolt against capital (Federici 2012, 99).11 Nevertheless, an important part of the 
collective struggle against affective labour is a refusal of its modes and demands 
as Hochschild depicts in relation to the smile strike of the flight attendants (Hoch-
schild 2003, 127).  Especially with the fact that women make up the majority within 
affective labour jobs, they can make the world experience how the various servic-
es they deliver would feel without the mothering, caring and smiling worker who 
delivers them. And even though Federici is worried that the category of affective 
labour could veil this important contradiction and inhibit the formation of pos-
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sible alliances over what can be refused between ‘mothers and children, teachers 
and students, nurses and patients’ (Federici 2012, 100), it seems to be precisely an 
exposition of the intersection between feminist, postcolonial and anti-capitalist 
struggles within specific affective labour contexts that could prevent this problem. 
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Endnotes
1 René Pollesch is a German author and theatre director, whose play Liebe ist kälter als 
das Kapital [Love is colder than capital] was first performed in Stuttgart, Germany in 
2007. All quotations from his play are my translations.
2 See the essays by Margaret Benson, Selma James, Mariarosa Dalla Costa, Christine Del-
phy and others in (Hennessy and Ingraham 1997).
3 While one could refer to all kinds of attempts that turned against Marxism in the wake of 
the crisis of French Marxism in the aftermath of ’68 and the end of the regime of so-called 
‘actually existing socialism’, I am referring here specifically to the attempts of Althusser 
and some of his students, who took this crisis seriously as a crisis of Marx’s and Marxism’s 
concepts and thus, started to interrogate his work for its internal limits and contradic-
tions. It is from this perspective that Étienne Balibar has elaborated the instability of the 
category of ‘materialism’ in Marx and its relapses into idealism through a specific defini-
tion of the proletariat as universal subject, the unity of praxis and the teleology of history 
at its inside. The central conclusion from these deconstructive efforts for this paper is 
that it will not be enough for a feminist-materialist critique to aim to include women’s 
work, paid or unpaid, into the labour-capital antagonism that Marx described. The ques-
tion of what kind of subjects the capitalist social formation produces, how and to which 
end it produces them and with what kind of effects for the political struggle are just as 
central to a materialist approach to social theory.
4 See for a problematisation of Negri’s use of the concept of ‘real subsumption’ Andres 
Saenz de Sicilia’s talk entitled Time & Subsumption: http://reificationofpersonsandper-
sonificationofthings.wordpress.com/2013/07/31/time-and-subsumption/ 
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5 The particular jobs usually summarized under the category of ‘affective labour’ will be 
discussed in the next section as there is an apparent relation between them and what is 
classically defined as women’s work.
6 As I noted in a different context, the concept of ‘socially necessary labour-time’ lies at the 
core of Marx’s value theory of labour, defined in Capital Vol.1 as follows: ‘Socially neces-
sary labour-time is the labour-time required to produce any use-value under the condi-
tion of production normal for a given society and with the average degree of skill and 
intensity of labour prevalent in that society.’ (Marx 1976, 129) Whereas there have been 
recent attempts to newly emphasise the crucial place of this concept in an understand-
ing of Marx’s theory (see e.g. Massimiliano Tomba, Marx’s Temporalities (Leiden: Brill, 
2013)), there is also an implicit danger of confusing ‘socially necessary labour-time’ with 
the embodied substance of concrete labour, which De Angelis and Harvie are certainly 
in danger of, when they use the concept in order to short-circuit between new forms of 
governing concrete forms of labour within cognitive capitalism and  what that means for 
the theory of value (see Michael Heinrich, Die Wissenschaft Vom Wert: Die Marxsche Kritik 
Der Politischen Ökonomie Zwischen Wissenschaftlicher Revolution Und Klassischer Tra-
dition (Westfälisches Dampfboot 2001, pp.199). An alternative way of understanding the 
‘war over measure’ might be via Jacques Rancière’s concept of ‘police’. Then the role of 
measurement within the overall becoming-commodity of knowledge would be to con-
trol and steer a process of normalisation of commodity production for economic valori-
sation, without conflating those two moments into one, This is however a debate, which 
demands a more exclusive discussion beyond this paper.
7 Dowling points towards the importance not to disaggregate affective and immaterial la-
bour from the often equally necessary material, physical labour for producing the final 
commodity such as a ‘dining experience’, which requires to then question hierarchies 
and inequalities between the different forms of labour going into the same product. (See 
Dowling 2007, 129)
8 For a feminist critique of the duality of value in Marx as neglecting or rather obscuring 
the exchange value of reproduction and housework as non-value through naturaliza-
tion, see Fortunati 1995. For the contemporary debate and its relation to the earlier 70s 
Marxist-Feminist discourse, see also http://www.commoner.org.uk/wp-content/up-
loads/2012/01/commoner_issue-15.pdf. It also needs to be borne in mind that the dis-
tinction between productive and reproductive labour is itself subjected to critique regard-
ing its adequacy in the contemporary capitalist regime, where both forms become less 
and less distinguishable, not only from the post-Workerist perspective (Weeks 2011, 140), 
but also from a contemporary structuralist account as for example Endnotes develops it 
(Endnotes 2013).
9 See for a deepening of the debate around the global restructuring of reproductive labour 
as part of a specific phase within capital accumulation the writings and edited works by 
Mariarosa and Giovanna F. Dalla Costa (Costa and Costa 1995; Costa and Costa 1999). 
10 Her fieldwork was conducted in households in Spain, Germany, Austria and the UK. 
(Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2010, 2)
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11 See also a recent interview with Federici published on Mute: http://www.metamute.org/
editorial/articles/permanent-reproductive-crisis-interview-silvia-federici
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